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DISTINGUISHED, FOLLOWED, AND OVERRULED
WEST VIRGINIA EXTENDS MILLS v. DEWEES
Under the heading "Procedure-Number of Causes of Action
Arising from Single Act of Wrongdoing Causing Both Personal and
Property Damage," the West Virginia case of Mills v. DeWees' was
commented upon in 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 114 (1957). In Mills v.
DeWees, the insured attempted, after a trial of the personal injury
claim, to bring a second action for property damage arising from the
same collision. In denying the second action, the court adopted the
rule of the majority of American jurisdictions that the single act of
wrongdoing by the defendant is the gist of the cause of action, thus
requiring the uniting of the claims for personal injuries and property
damages in one action.2 This is contrary to the English view and that
taken in a minority of American jurisdictions, which regards the re-
sulting damages to the plaintiff as the criterion of a cause of action.
Under this view there are thus two independent causes of action for the
two distinct harms suffered by the plaintiff.3
193 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1956).
Wan Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Jenkins v. Skelton,
21 Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249 (192o); Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. 2d 507, 58 P.2d 662
(1936); Seger v. Town of Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290 (1853); Wealth v. Renai, 114
A.2d 807 (Del. 1955); Gregory v. Schnurstein, 212 Ga. 497, 93 S.E.2d 68o (1956);
Bennett v. Dove, 93 Ga. App. 57, 90 S.E.2d 6O (1955); Fiscus v. Kansas City Pub.
-Serv. Co., 153 Kan. 493, 112 P.2d 83 (1941); Pillsbury v. Kesslen Shoe Co., 136
Me. 235, 7 A.2d 898 ('939); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Ritchie, 31 Md. 191 (1869);
Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (ig3g); Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
279 Mich. 6o3, 273 N.W. 284 (1937); Coy v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R., 186 Mo.
App. 408, 172 S.W. 446 (1915); Farmer's Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429 (N.D.
1953); Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 At. 59 (1922);
Flickner v. One Chevrolet Truck & Trailer, 178 S.C. 53, 182 S.E. 104 (1935); Globe
9- Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83, 34 S.W.2d 1059 (1931); Smith v.
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893 (1929); Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A.2d 96
(1943); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 51o, 247 Pac. 96o (1926); Booth v. Franken-
stein, 209 Wis. 362, 245 N.W. 191 (1932). See Southern Ry. v. King, 16o Fed. 332,
335 (5th Cir. 19o8); Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 31o, 181 N.E. 28, 29 (1932);
Boos v. Claude, 69 S.D. 254, 9 N.W.2d 262, 264 (1943).
3Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Mosby, 250 Fed. 839 (2d Cir. 1918); Boyd v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 218 Fed. 653 (S.D. Ga. 1914); Clancy v. McBride, 338 111. 35,
169 N.E. 729 (1930); Smith v. Red-Top Taxicab Corp., iii N.J.L. 439, 168 Ad. 796
(1933); Ochs v. Public Service Ry., 81 N.J. 661, 8o Ad. 495 (1911); Reilly v. Sicilian
Asphalt Paving Co., 17o N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902); Timian v. Whelan, 128 Misc. 192,
218 N.Y. Supp. io8 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Vasu v. Kohlers Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d
707 (1945); Baltimore American Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 181 Okla. 244, 73 P.2d 167 ('937);
Winters v. Bisallon, 153 Ore. 509, 57 P.2d 1095 (1936); Watson v. Texas Pac. Ry., 8
Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S.W. 924 (1894); Carter v. Hinkle, 18g Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d
135 (1949); Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q.B.D. 141 (1884).
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After this prior action by the insured, the insurance company, in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. DeWees,4 sought to main-
tain as subrogee of the insured an action against the tortfeasor for prop-
erty damage. The action was denied. A contrary ruling, the court felt,
would allow the splitting of what logically is a single cause of action.
This later case, therefore, carried Mills v. DeWees to its logical con-
clusion. On the question of what constitutes a cause of action-negli-
gence or damage-West Virginia adheres rigorously to the theory that
it is the negligence.
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. DeWees offered the West Virginia
court an excellent opportunity to adopt an intermediate approach
which exists in a few jurisdictions.5 This view does not specifically ac-
cept the minority concept by allowing two causes of action to the same
plaintiff generally. Instead, it regards the insurer as having an equitable
interest in the automobile at the time of collision by reason of its
having written the policy of insurance; thus, when the automobile is
damaged an independent cause of action arises in favor of the insured.
West Virginia could well have adopted this approach, a mere qualifi-
cation of the majority rule in cases involving subrogation, without
having to overrule its previous decision in Mills v. DeWees.6
It is unfortunate that the West Virginia court relied solely on
Mills. v. DeWees as precedent, since the cases cited therein to support
the majority view were not influenced by the element of subrogation.7
Aiml S.E.-2d 273 (W. Va. 1957).
'Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp. v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 242 Ala.
559, 7 So. 2d 29o (1942); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 3o4 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d
7 (1947); Underwriters at Lloyds Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., io6 Miss. 244, 63 So.
455 (1913); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. ioo, 147 S.E. 686 (1929).
0Having previously been a proponent of the ptrict majority rule, Kentucky, in
Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947), approved the
intermediate view but cautioned through dictum that there could possibly develop
instances where exceptions to the "exception to the general rule" would be proper
to facilitate the same justice contemplated in adopting the intermediate view.
This approach did not require the Kentucky court to overrule its previous de-
cisions adhering to the strict majority view in cases not involving subrogation, such
as Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S.W. 129 (1916), and Cole's Adm'x v.
Illinois Central R.R., 12o Ky. 686, 87 S.W. 1o82 (19o5). In Traveler's Indemnity
Co. v. Moore, supra, the court noted that it was hardly possible to have a general
rule without an exception.
Mississippi, another intermediate jurisdiction, has also upheld the majority
view in cases where subrogation was not involved. Kimball v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94
Miss. 396, 48 So. 23o (109o). Dicta in intermediate view decisions, cited in note 5
supra, indicates that the majority rule will be adhered to when cases not involving
subrogation arise in those jurisdictions.
Wasu v. Kohlers Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707, 716 (1945); and see
cases cited note 2 supra.
